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Abstract 
A theoretical and empirical innovation of the household production model is 
the appearance of wages in demand functions. However, creating reasonable 
econometric instruments for wages is difficult under any circumstances and is 
particularly troublesome when using data from developing countries, where the 
prevalence of nonmarket production means that few observations on wages are 
usually available. In this paper, alternative strategies for creating 
value-of-time instruments are discussed in detail and, using cross-sectional 
data from the Philippines, competing methods are implemented and compared. The 
major finding is that the theory and procedure of correcting for selection bias 
can substantially improve wage instruments. 
INTRODUCTION 
Demand equations derived from the household production model--which 
focuses on productive activities in the home, human capital, the opportunity 
cost of time, and prices as determinants of household resource allocation 
decisions--have been used increasingly to explain household behavior in 
developing countries. The model's emphasis on time allocation and the price 
of time, a quantity and a price that are absent from standard consumer demand 
models, is a theoretical innovation that has improved our understanding of 
many family-level decisions that have a distinct economic content, including 
those pertaining to fertility, health, nutrition, labor supply, education, 
migration, and agricultural production. However, that innovation is also the 
source of an empirical burden: the need to create reasonable measures of time 
prices. 
Unlike the price of homogeneous commodities, the price of time is 
intimately linked to individual human characteristics and is therefore 
difficult to measure as a purely exogenous variable. Using individual wage 
rates to measure the value of time, which would capture the heterogeneous 
nature of labor, is made difficult by the fact that wages are generally 
observed only for people who work in market jobs. In developing countries, 
where there are high levels of self employment, wide use of unpaid family 
labor in income-producing activities, and substantial reliance on home 
production for consumption needs, wages are rarely observed. Many strategies 
have been followed to estimate wages in the face of this problem, including 
reliance on community wage rates, simple and complex regressions to create 
wage instruments, estimates of both wage offers and reservation wages, and 
begging the question altogether by dropping value-of-time variables. 
One of the advantages of regression methods is that they facilitate 
2 
detection and correction of selection bias, which is potentially a serious 
problem in samples for which few wage observations are available. There is 
little regard in the literature, however, for statistical problems that are 
inherent in the selection-correction procedure and almost no knowledge of the 
effect of selection bias on wage predictions and the performance of wage 
instruments in demand equations. 
This paper discusses alternative methods for estimating the value of time 
for married women in a developing country context, bringing together different 
strands of the literature that help to structure the exercise. A model is 
outlined in the next section that demonstrates why wage estimates are 
necessary and how theory helps to specify the solution to the wage-estimating 
problem. Then the literature is examined to point out how empirical solutions 
differ. Finally, wage and earnings estimates are presented for a sample of 
Philippine women, and conclusions are drawn about competing wage estimation 
approaches. 
MODEL 
The form of a typical but simplified household production model and its 
implications are illustrated below. Suppose a household maximizes the 
following concave utility function: 
U = U(C,L.) (1)
i 
C = a vector of home-produced commodities, such as 
nutrition, health, child quality, or number of 
children 
L. - leisure of the ith household member (i=l, ... ,n) 
C, L: ~ 0 
i 
Each commodity is produced in the home using purchases of market goods and 
household members' time, with positive but decreasing marginal productivity of 
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inputs: 
C = f(X, TH. ;E) (2)
1. 
X = a vector of market-purchased goods used to produce 
each element in C, per unit of C 
TH.= home time of the ith household member used to produce
l. each C, per unit of C 
E - fixed components of household technology such as 
skills or home capital goods 
Leisure is modeled as a decreasing function of the two alternatives: 
L. h(TM., TH. ;T) (3)
1. 1. 1. 
TM. = market work of the ith family member 
1. 
T. - total time available 
1. 
h' < 0 
The household is limited in its goods purchases by pecuniary and time 
constraints that define the standard linear full-income constraint: 
(p'X + ~.TH.)C + ~.L. ~ Y +~.(TM.+ TH.) (4)
1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
p - price vector of market inputs 
Y = nonlabor household income 
w. - market wage rate of ith family member 
1. 
The household's problem is therefore to maximize the Lagrangean: 
i = U[f(X,TH;E), h(TM,TH;T)] + A[Y +~(TH+ TM) - (p'X + ~TH)C - wL] (5) 
in which, for notational simplicity, the subscripts have been dropped. The 
maximization problem yields the following first-order conditions: 
ai 
ax ~~ ~i ApC ~ 0, X ~ 0, and x[~i] = 0 (6) 
ai 
8TM ~~ ~~M +AW~ 0, TM~ 0, and TM[~iM] 0 (7) 
ai 
8TH ~~ ~iH + ~~ ~~H + AW - AwC ~ 0, TH~ 0, and TH[~iH] 0 (8) 
ai 
8A 
Y +~(TH+ TM) - (p'X + ~TH)C - wL ~ 0, A~ 0, and A [aa~]A 0 (9) 
Because the utility function is assumed to be concave in its arguments, the 
second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied, and optimal values of the 
4 
endogenous variables can be expressed as implicit functions of the exogenous 
variables. The following reduced-form demand equations for goods, time, and 
commodities can be written: 







C = C(p,w,Y;E) (13) 
In this exposition, knowledge of T, TM, and TH at the optimum for each family 
member fixes the residual demand for leisure (L). Equations (10) through (13) 
imply that values of the endogenous variables are jointly determined by 
prices, wages, nonlabor income, and household technology. 
In empirical work, any one of these reduced-form equations can be 
estimated independently, with unbiased coefficients. However, any such 
undertaking requires exogenous values for prices (p) and wages (w). Community 
prices and wages are natural choices because they are arguably determined in 
the market at a level that is beyond the influence of household decisions. 
However, if analysts desire wage estimates that more explicitly take into 
account individual characteristics, a set of problems is created that can be 
illustrated using the first-order conditions. 
One or more family members are likely to work at home and not in the 
market, so there will be many situations in which a corner solution is chosen 
for equation (7) but an interior solution is chosen for equation (8), giving 
rise to the following inequality: 
au ah au af au ah 
~m<_a_f_a_T~H_+_a_h_a_T_H (14) 
w - w(l C) 
At the most obvious level, equation (14) indicates that the decision to 
stay out of the labor market is not a random event. For the person who works 
---
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at home but not in the market, the value to the household of the last hour 
devoted to home work is greater than the value of devoting that hour to market 
work. If equation (14) is slightly modified so that the "price" of work is 
W, the wage offer, and the "price" of work at home is W, the reservationo r 
wage, we have the following: 
au ah au af au ah 
ah aTM af 8TH + ah 8TH (14a) 
w W (1-C)
0 r 
For given utility and production functions, there is some combination of a 
wage offer and a reservation wage at which the two sides of the equation are 
equal and the household is just indifferent to this member's moving from TM=O 
to working in the market. For that person and anyone who works in the market, 
W = W = w. For an individual who does not work in the market, equationr o 
(14a) implies that W > W. r o 
The value of li necessary to equalize the two sides depends on both the 
utility and production functions. The marginal valuation of hours devoted to 
market work depends only on the labor-leisure choice (the utility function), 
while the marginal valuation of nonmarket work depends on both the 
labor-leisure choice and marginal productivity in nonmarket activities. 
Variables that affect productivity at home, such as land and business 
holdings, do not affect productivity in the market. 
2 
To extend this line of reasoning to wages, the implication is that market 
wage offers, which are determined by characteristics that affect market 
productivity, are not affected by a number of variables that do, however, 
This approach assumes, of course, that productivity in the market and 
productivity in the home are not both affected by the same variables. The 
efficiency wage literature is concerned directly with this issue. See Bliss 
and Stern (1978) for the conditions under which such an assumption would hold. 
2 
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affect reservation wages through the marginal productivity of nonmarket work. 
This distinction can be pursued in empirical work to create restrictions which 
allow identification of the coefficients in the wage offer and reservation 
wage equations. 
STRATEGIES FOR ESTIMATING THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF TIME 
Researchers cannot avoid predicting wages, even if most of the sample 
reports wages. Errors in measurement, unobserved on-the-job training effects, 
and faulty observations on hours can all be transmitted to the wage variable, 
requiring some sort of instrumental variable estimation technique if wages are 
to be used as independent variables in other regressions (Schultz, 1980). 
Consequently, a decision must be made about creating proxies for R· 
Following is a list of alternative strategies with citations for studies using 
each technique: 
(1) Use a community wage rate obtained from another survey, 
create a community wage by averaging reported wages from 
the sample being used, or ask a community leader to 
estimate a market wage rate (Khandker, 1985). 
(2) Drop those observations for which the wage is missing 
(Grossman, 1972). 
(3) Instead of using a wage variable, use highly correlated 
variables (age, race, ethnicity, education) as 
substitutes for wages in a reduced form demand equation 
(Akin et al., 1985). 
(4) Estimate a wage function for people who report wages, then 
use the estimated coefficients to create a wage 
instrument for the entire sample (Smith, 1981; McCabe and 
Rosenzweig, 1976). 
(5) Realizing that observations on wages are not randomly 
missing, use the procedure in (4) after correcting for 
possible sample selection bias (Anderson, 1982). 
The first alternative (a community wage rate) has some desirable 
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features. It is exogenous to the household and, relative to a predicted wage, 
collinearity between the wage variable and other household- or 
individual-level regressors is probably reduced. For historical series, 
community or national wage averages trace general movements in wage rates 
(Schultz, 1985). 
The principal drawback of the community wage strategy is that it discards 
information about the effects on wages of individuals' human capital 
investments, such as training and education. A common argument in favor of 
community wages is that the only alternative to work at home for rural women 
is work as agricultural laborers, so a community-level agricultural wage 
adequately captures the opportunity cost to them of working at home. However, 
a number of studies (Rosenzweig, 1984; Anderson and Leiserson, 1980) have 
demonstrated that labor markets in rural areas of low-income countries are 
well developed and that the return to human capital investments can be quite 
high. It is unlikely under any circumstances that highly educated women face 
the same wage offers as uneducated women or that they are equally productive 
outside the market. 
The second approach (dropping observations with missing wages) is 
difficult to defend. If only a few observations are eliminated and wage data 
are randomly missing, the loss of information only reduces the efficiency of 
parameter estimates. If observations are discarded nonrandomly, which would 
be the expectation given the theory outlined above, the sample is transformed 
from a censored sample into a truncated sample. 
The third option (using proxies) at least retains the whole sample, but 
it is difficult to imagine a proxy for wages that should not itself appear in 
demand equations. The fourth approach (OLS without a selection correction) 
8 
has been used in the past to avoid problems caused by the other procedures. 
However, the literature on selection bias has established that if those who 
work in the market are systematically different from nonworkers in terms of 
unmeasured characteristics that affect wages (such as innate ability or desire 
to participate in the market), this procedure generates inconsistent parameter 
estimates for the wage equation. 
Through the utility maximization process discussed earlier, households or 
individuals formulate a reservation wage (W ), which is the wage at which they
r 
are indifferent between supplying hours to the market or staying at home. 
Similarly, people face a demand signal, or wage offer (W ), from the market. 
0 
The supply and demand functions are shown below as linear equations (Heckman, 




w r (16) 
H = hours of market work, 





= jointly normal 
matrix: 
errors with zero mean and covariance 
If a =0 and hours adjust to equate W and W, the probability of working is
1 o r 
given by F(Q), where Fis the normal distribution function and Q is shown 
3below. 
The assumption that a =0 simply means that the household or individual
1faces a perfectly elastic demand curve for labor hours--the usual assumption 
that any number of hours can be supplied at the market wage. The following 
definitions apply to equation (17): 




ao + a2Z - Po - P2X 
Q = --------- (17)
a 
e 
The population means of the two dependent variables are given by the following 
equations: 
E(W le :SQ) (18)
0 
(19) 
v and v are residuals with E(Vi)=O. The f(Q)/F(Q) and f(Q)/1-F(Q) terms1 2 
correct the residuals for truncation, and their coefficients measure the 
covariance between the errors in the participation equation and the respective 
wage equation. Using the fourth (simple least squares) procedure to create 
wage estimates fails to incorporate the selection term in equation (18), 
wrongly forcing a1e=O and thus biasing the remaining coefficients. 
Using the fifth (selection-correcting) procedure to estimate wages has 
many desirable characteristics. It allows wage offers to be affected by human 
capital variables, retains the whole sample, creates unbiased parameter 
estimates in the wage function, allows estimation of reservation wages, and 
avoids combining wage effects into other regressors. Equation (18) can be 
estimated by maximum likelihood; alternatively, Heckman and others have 
4developed two-step procedures that are widely used. 
The two-step probit (based on the normal error distribution) has been 
adapted to a logit-based model (Weibull distribution) by Hay (1980) and Lee 
(1983), and to the linear probability model (uniform distribution) by Olsen 
(1980a). In another paper, Olsen (1980b) offers a statistically inconsistent 
least squares approximation to the Heckman maximum likelihood method. In 
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Equations (18) and (19) provide unbiased estimates of the population 
means of W and W, but these means are conditional on working and not o r 
working, respectively. How can a researcher predict a single opportunity cost 
of time for everyone? One obvious strategy is to predict a market wage for 
workers from equation (18) and a reservation wage for nonworkers from equation 
(19), conditional on prior knowledge about whether they work in the market. A 
second and more common approach is to predict a market wage for everyone from 
equation (18), but that procedure creates a wage estimate for nonworkers 
conditional on their working in the market, which is counterfactual. 
A third strategy is to predict an unconditional wage offer for the whole 
sample, which is an average weighted by the probability of working in the 
market: 
E(W) [E(W le s Q)]F(Q) + [E(W le > Q)][l-F(Q)], or (20)
0 0 0 
E(W) a 0F(Q) + a2Z[F(Q)] - a 1£f(Q). (21)0 
Equation (21) is based on the fact that the observed wage offer is zero for 
nonworkers; hence, its expectation is zero (Maddala, 1983). 
STATISTICAL COMPLICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH SELECTION BIAS CORRECTIONS 
Substantial research has been devoted to detecting selectivity bias and 
to technical aspects of the various correction procedures. A gap exists, 
however, between theorists, who have been concerned with consistency and 
efficiency of parameter estimates, and users of the selection model, who have 
still another paper, Olsen (1982) demonstrates a maximum likelihood estimator 
that allows for skewed convolutions of the normal distribution. For 
applications of the probit procedure see Maddala (1983). For an example of 
the logit procedure see Blau (1981); for the Olsen linear probability 
procedure see Pitt and Rosenzweig (1985); and for the Olsen nonnormal 
estimator see Anderson (1982). 
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been primarily interested in prediction. Two shortcomings of the literature 
are a lack of regard for econometric problems caused by the selection 
correction method and little knowledge of its impact on wage predictions. For 
researchers interested in simply creating a wage instrument, it is an open 
question whether correcting for selectivity bias has a strong enough effect on 
wage predictions to make the associated statistical costs worthwhile. The 
remainder of this section is devoted to discussing statistical problems that 
may be introduced by the selection correction. 
Validity of Selection Rules 
In any sample, values of the dependent variable may be missing due to 
nonreporting by individuals who participate in the labor market. There is a 
strong temptation to suspect that other selection rules cause nonreporting and 
to compensate for them in order to fill in the missing values. Unless there 
is a theoretical reason to expect nonreporting to be systematically 
determined, however, the OLS residuals should not be truncated. The potential 
for identification problems and multicollinearity resulting from multiple 
selection criteria (discussed below) dictate that trivial selection rules be 
5avoided. 
Nonnormality of Errors 
It is so common in research to assume that random variables are drawn 
5 
One study (Behrman et al., 1980) estimates wages for a sample of 
Nicaraguan women, 46 percent of whom participate in the labor force. About 8 
percent of the workers do not report wages. The authors posit a sequential 
decision-making process in which the women first decide whether to work, then 
decide whether to report earnings. However, no theoretical reasoning 
justifies why failure to report earnings is other than a random event, so it 
is difficult to justify the choice of variables that explain reporting. None 
of the coefficients for variables chosen to explain nonreporting is 
significantly different from zero, and selection on reporting is not 
statistically significant in the wage equations. 
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from normal populations that few analysts are likely to be troubled by the 
assumption that the errors in equations (15) and (16) have a bivariate normal 
distribution. However, detection of selection bias actually depends on a 
truly normal error distribution appearing to be nonnormal because of 
truncation. If the errors appear to be nonnormal because they actually come 
from a nonnormal distribution, selection bias may be inferred when it is not 
the problem (Olsen, 1982). 
The recent literature has explored the sensitivity of the selection 
correction to nonnormality. Goldberger (1983), through a simulation exercise, 
shows that the Tobit model is sensitive to departures from normality to a 
degree that is positively related to the amount of truncation. Olsen (1982) 
tests for selectivity bias in wage estimates for teenagers under the 
alternative assumptions of normal and nonnormal errors. He finds that the 
underlying distribution is probably nonnormal but that selection is 
statistically significant--and the estimated coefficients similar--under 
either assumption about the errors. 
Anderson (1982) describes similar results for wage estimates for a sample 
of Guatemalan men. She compares wage instruments estimated three different 
ways--least squares, selection correction assuming normally distributed 
errors, and selection correction under the assumption of nonnormal errors. 
The estimated wage elasticities in a fertility demand equation are nearly 
identical for wage instruments created using either least squares or 
selection-corrected coefficients, but correcting for nonnormal errors 
increases the elasticity nearly four-fold. Anderson concludes that selection 
bias is less important for her sample than are nonnormal errors. The Olsen 
and Anderson studies suggest that nonnormal errors may not strongly affect the 
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detection of selection bias or estimated coefficients, but Anderson's findings 
show that the effects may not be entirely neutral when the point is to create 
wage instruments in demand equations. 
Identification 
This is a simultaneous equations model, yet little attention is usually 
paid to identification. If the parameters of the offered wage equation (18) 
are estimated using the working subsample, the selection effect can be 
A A 
identified if the matrix [Z f(Q)/F(Q)] is full rank. This result is 
guaranteed if the participation equation is estimated by probit or logit 
A A A 
because even if Zand the determinants of Qare identical, f(Q)/F(Q) is a 
A 
nonlinear function of Q and will not be perfectly collinear with Z. 
Researchers often rely on the nonlinearities implicit in the estimation method 
0to i denti.fy t e wage coeff.icients. If the full model 
equations (18) and (19) is estimated, recovering the coefficients of the 
reservation wage equation requires,that at least one variable in Z be excluded 
from X. Alternatively, a =0 can be assumed. Any approach contains an 
h · 6 represented by 
12 
element of arbitrariness. 
Multicollinearity 
A A 
Because [f(Q)/F(Q)] is a nonlinear function of variables that appear in 
both Zand X, if nonlinear terms are incorrectly excluded from Z (such as the 
square of experience), their nonlinear effects may be picked up by the 
selection term in the wage equation (Olsen 1980a). The coefficient on the 
selection term might therefore be incorrectly judged to be statistically 
6 
In the linear probability model, however, identification requires that 
at least one regressor appearing in the participation equation be excluded 
from the wage offer equation (Olsen, 1980a). If there is more than one 
selection criterion and the criteria are sequential, identification requires 
additional exclusionary restrictions (Behrman et al., 1980). 
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significant when it is actually picking up the effects of excluded nonlinear 
terms. Moreover, as the presence of nonlinear and interaction terms in Z 
increases, the potential for multicollinearity between those regressors and 
the selection correction term rises Olsen (1980a). Multiple selection 
criteria exacerbate this problem; the same variables are likely to enter the 
different selection rules and the wage equation. 
Two-Stage versus Full Maximum Likelihood 
Although the popular two-step probit/OLS selection correction procedure 
produces consistent estimates of the coefficients of the wage equation, the 
efficiency gains in using the full information maximum likelihood alternative 
can be substantial, and other problems (such as incorrect t-statistics) are 
avoided (Wales and Woodland 1980). Does efficiency matter? The answer from 
Monte Carlo experiments seems to be resoundingly positive. Under conditions 
most likely to prevail in empirical work--considerable overlap among exogenous 
variables in the selection criterion and those in the wage equation--the 
precision of the two-step estimator declines sharply. The maximum likelihood 
estimator, in contrast, is insensitive to this type of correlation if there is 
selection bias. In addition, its precision increases as the covariance 
between e and e in equations 15 and 16 goes up, which is what we are trying1 2 
to measure (Nelson 1984). The more serious is the selectivity problem, the 
more important efficiency becomes, so the two-step estimator is least 
desirable under exactly the conditions that prompt its use. 
This review suggests that while the problems caused by not correcting for 
selectivity when it actually exists are well understood, the complications 
resulting from the correction itself may also be serious. The performance of 
different estimating procedures in creating wage instruments is consequently 
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an important consideration. 
ESTIMATION 
The goal of the empirical work is to implement and evaluate the various 
wage estimation methods using a single set of data. The data come from the 
first panel of the Bicol Multipurpose Survey, which includes 1,903 households 
and their 12,000 residents in the Bicol region of the Philippines (Popkin and 
Roco, 1979). The sample is reduced for this work to 1,688 households (89 
percent of the total) for which both husband and wife were present in 1978. 
There are three elements of the economic environment that cause problems 
for creating value-of-time estimates. One element is diversity of human 
capital formation and employment opportunities. In the Bicol sample, 78 
percent of the married women had a primary education or less, 10 percent had 
done some high school work, and 12 percent had completed high school (half of 
whom--6 percent--had gone on to college). This dichotomy between a mass of 
women with little schooling and a small number of highly educated women is 
reflected in the working subsample's occupations. About 78 percent were 
employed in low-skilled jobs (petty trading, handicraft-making, and farm 
labor) for which wage offers might be adequately approximated by a 
community-level agricultural wage, while 8 percent worked as school teachers 
or in administrative and clerical positions. A community or agricultural wage 
would not capture offered wages for these "outliers" with substantial 
schooling and modern sector jobs, nor would it capture differences in 
productivity at home that are due to variation in human capital. 
A second element is diversity of economic activities. In industrialized 
economies, employment patterns can be specified in terms of particular jobs or 
16 
professions. In the Bicol region, as in other rural economies, there is 
generally little specialization. Three-fifths of the sample households were 
agricultural in 1977, but almost all households, whether farm or not, raised 
livestock and poultry. Approximately 32 percent were engaged in two or more 
separate economic activities (such as farming and trading), not counting wage 
jobs. 
The large variety of economic activities causes problems for both the 
researcher and the women. The researcher must sift out of this complex 
information a summary measure of their opportunity cost of time. The women, 
who may be engaged in several different economic activities over a year's 
time--as paid laborers, unpaid family workers, and unpaid but income-seeking 
entrepreneurs--must give reasonable answers to a field worker who asks whether 
they have an occupation, how much they earn, and how many hours they work. 
The third environmental element is the large proportion of the sample (42 
percent) who considered themselves to be primarily housewives. Those women 
were engaged in productive work that was not traded and therefore not valued 
in the market; consequently, no information is reported on their value of time 
or hours of work. In fact, if those who did not work and those who worked but 
did not report earnings are combined, earnings and wage observations are 
missing for 70 percent of the women. 
Creating a Community Wage Variable 
Although the Bicol survey does not contain community-level wage data, it 
does contain three different variables that can be used to create agricultural 
wage averages: 
(1) What farmers paid per day for hired workers, 
(2) What farmers estimated as the replacement cost per day for 
each family member who worked on the farm, and 
17 
(3) Daily wage rates for people who worked as farm laborers. 
Averages are calculated across crops for each farmer, then these numbers are 
7 dwit in communities, · 
Table 1 contains community wage averages for this sample. 
8 
averaged across f armers . h" . . eve1opment zones, or provinces. 
Table 1 about here 
Within each category of worker (men, women, and children), community 
averages vary substantially by calculation method. Although in farm work we 
might expect men to be paid the most, women somewhat less, and children least, 
this ordering is not maintained across all calculations. There is, however, 
close agreement between the average wage farmers reported paying hired workers 
for cultivation (the top group of numbers in the table) and average estimated 
replacement cost for family workers (the third group of numbers). The 
standard deviations for these two calculations are also similar and relatively 
small. For these reasons and because of relatively large sample sizes, 
"estimated replacement cost for family workers" is the most likely choice for 
a community wage variable. Even so, 11 percent of the barangays have missing 
values for women, and for the other 89 percent of the communities, wage 
estimates are based on an average of only about six women each. The average 
daily wage for women in this sample is estimated to be 5.1 pesos per day by 
this measure. 
7 
The survey contains 100 communities, 20 development zones, and 3 
provinces. Each community contains about 20 sample households. 
8 
Additional difficulties become obvious when these calculations are 
undertaken. Farmers pay different wages for different crops, they pay 
differentially for cultivating relative to harvesting, and they use different 
payment methods. Rice cultivators are generally paid by the day while 
harvester/threshers are paid a share of the harvest. 
18 
Specifying the Wage Function 
Equations (15) and (16) require specification of the determinants of the 
wage offer, Z, and the reservation wage, X. Table 2 contains a list of the 
variables chosen for analysis. 
Table 2 about here 
Wage offer. The wage offer is a Mincer-type equation, where the 
estimated coefficients measure the realized rate of return to human capital 
investments in schooling and experience. The standard proxy for experience, 
age minus education minus 6, is used because it is an exogenous measure of 
potential work experience. The linear and quadratic terms allow for a 
positive but diminishing return to additional years of experience. Education 
enters in the standard linear form as a proxy for human capital investments in 
schooling (it is also, of course, an element in the experience calculation). 
Variables are also included in the wage offer equation to control for 
available opportunities. City residence measures availability of market work 
in the modern wage sector, which is concentrated in cities, and should have a 
positive effect on wage offers. Travel time from house to town center 
controls for differences in infrastructure development. 
Reservation wage. City residence is excluded from the reservation wage 
equation partially to help identify the coefficients but also because 
differing labor market conditions in urban and rural areas do not affect 
reservation wages or home productivity. Transport time to the municipal 
center is included because additional time required for traveling to carry out 
home duties (such as marketing) should raise reservation wages (and lower 
participation). 
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"Husband's wage" should also appear as a regressor because if the wife is 
a secondary worker, her husband's wage will raise her reservation wage. There 
are so few observations on men's wages for the same reasons that there are few 
observations on women's wages that the determinants of the husband's offered 
wage--experience and education--are included directly. Husband's experience 
and education should have positive effects on reservation wages and negative 
effects on participation. 
Similarly, nonlabor income--including rents, winnings from gambling, 
pensions, interest, and gifts--should raise the reservation wage and reduce 
the probability of participating. Agricultural land and business ownership 
measure land and capital assets that raise productivity in nonmarket 
activities and reduce the probability of participating in the labor market. 
Asset holdings, such as the house, lot, and vehicles, are included as a proxy 
for accumulated or endowed wealth and should negatively affect participation. 
One important exclusion from the reservation wage equation is number of 
children. Child-bearing and work decisions are closely related, and the number 
of children at home is undoubtedly connected with the reservation wage. 
However, child-bearing and labor market decisions simultaneously affect each 
other, and it is rarely possible to include exogenous variables that identify 
fertility from women's work decisions in a cross section. Because one 
important use of wage instruments is to estimate the response of fertility to 
wages, wages must be estimated on the basis of variables that are exogenous to 
both work and fertility decisions. 
Labor market participation. The decision rule governing participation in 
the labor market is the difference between the explanatory variables in the 
offered and reservation wage equations (equation 17). Differentiating workers 
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from nonworkers is, however, a treacherous task. Women were asked their 
occupations, their earnings if they worked, the number of hours worked in a 
week, and the number of weeks worked during 1977. Of 1686 women, 9 978 
reported that they were" ... engaged in [some] type of occupational work in 
1977" and named an occupation. When asked if they were paid for their work, 
515 out of 978 replied "yes" and reported earnings and hours. For the 463 who 
worked but did not get paid, there are no reported earnings, hence no wage 
estimate. The possible responses are organized schematically in figure 1. 
Figure 1 about here 
The main issue is what to do about the 463 women who claimed to work but 
did not get paid. One possible strategy is to follow the Behrman et al. 
(1980) assumption that earnings responses are not randomly missing for working 
women; instead, women decide whether to participate, then those who 
participate decide whether to report earnings. An alternative is to more 
carefully define market workers. If a woman worked but received no earnings, 
the work was almost certainly carried out as an unpaid family laborer. It 
would be irrational to work without pay otherwise, so the only women who 
should be counted as having market jobs are those who said they worked and 
received remuneration. In the terminology of the rural labor supply 
literature, the underlying concern is with an off-farm labor supply function. 
Wage Estimates 
Table 3 reports results for the wage offer equation estimated three ways: 
full information maximum likelihood for the selection model, the two-step 
The sample of 1688 women has been reduced to 1686 because of missing
values for variables used in the analysis. 
9 
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(probit/OLS) selection procedure, and OLS without a selection correction. The 
two selection-corrected estimates depend on the participation equation, which 
is also reported and will be discussed first. 
The coefficient signs in the participation equation are generally as 
expected. Experience (the number of years since leaving school) has a 
positive but decreasing effect on participation. Woman's education raises the 
probability of working in the market, but husband's education (and, pari 
passu, his wage) reduces it. Although the household's nonlabor income, 
assets, and agricultural land holdings have the expected negative signs, they 
are not statistically significant. Owning a business, however, significantly 
reduces participation. Living in a city raises the probability of working, 
but distance to a town has no discernable effect. 
Table 3 about here 
For the MLE wage equation, experience has a positive but decreasing 
effect on wages that disappears for the average person in the sample at about 
50 years of age. Education has a strong positive effect on wages, with an 18 
percent return to a additional schooling. City residence increases wages, but 
transport time has a slight positive effect as well: living in a city raises 
the average wage, but greater isolation also has a positive effect. The 
covariance across errors in the wage and participation equations (ale) is 
highly significant, indicating that selection bias is important for this 
sample. 
Alternative Estimation Strategies: Effects on the Coefficients. A first 
test of the different estimation methods is to compare coefficients across the 
three wage equations reported in table 3. The main difference is that the 
22 
selection bias procedures (MLE and two-step) identify a stronger role for the 
independent variables than does the simple 0LS equation. The absolute 
magnitude of the coefficients increases substantially in the consistent two­
step estimate relative to the uncorrected 0LS estimates; they do the same 
again under the efficient MLE procedure. Relative to the uncorrected OLS 
coefficients, for example, the slope for education increases by nearly 30 
percent under MLE; for city residence, the coefficient increases by about 67 
percent. The MLE estimate shows a positive and slowly declining effect of 
experience on wages that goes to zero at 43 years. For the two-step approach, 
experience has a positive effect on wages through 63 years (outside the 
potential range of experience for most people); but the 0LS estimate detects 
no effect of experience on wages. 
The coefficient on the inverse of Mills' ratio (from equation 10: a £)1 
is 59 percent larger in the MLE estimate as compared to the two-step estimate, 
and it is far more precisely estimated. In the 0LS estimate, the selection 
coefficient is of course constrained to zero. The gain in efficiency from the 
MLE method is important for this sample, which is consistent with Nelson's 
(1984) Monte Carlo experiment. The coefficients are biased toward zero in the 
simple 0LS procedure; moreover, although selection bias is strong, it is not 
well detected by the two-stage method. 
Interpreting the Effects of Selection. The coefficients in the MLE 
version suggest that if women were randomly picked out of the population and 
given more schooling, their offered wages would rise about a third faster than 
the already substantial effect estimated using a sample containing only those 
women who already work. Similarly, experience has a much stronger (although 
decreasing) effect on wage offers once selectivity bias is corrected. Women 
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with more education and experience are more likely to select themselves into 
the labor force; filtering out the participation effect isolates the true 
effect of schooling and experience on market wage offers for randomly chosen 
women. 
Even though the effects of education and experience are enhanced by the 
selection correction, a premium is also paid for unobserved characteristics of 
women who are more likely to engage in market work. The sign on the selection 
coe · · l O · d · h f . d . . d . d ff icient in icates tat or given e ucation, experience, an resi ence, 
the mean of the offered wage is raised as the probability of participating in 
market work increases. This finding is consistent with the notion that women 
who choose to engage in market work are relatively more productive there than 
at home. 
Table 4 about here 
In table 4, the effect of the selection correction on predicted wages is 
made clearer. The first column of numbers shows the average of predicted 
wages based on the MLE wage offer estimates, but without the selection term. 
These numbers indicate that on the basis of experience, education, and 
residence only, women in the working sample would be offered, on average, .18 
pesos per hour; nonparticipants would receive average offers of .12 pesos. 
When participation is added, the predicted wage offer goes up to 1.02 pesos 
and .84 pesos, respectively. For the average participant, the probability of 
participating alone accounts for 82 percent of the wage offer. 
Note that in estimating the wage offer equation (18), we are 
estimating -a as the coefficient on the selection-correction term. If the1estimated sign£on this term is negative, as it is in table 3, the total effect 
of the selection term is positive. 
10 
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Table 4 also demonstrates how the high premium paid to participation 
amplifies the error of estimating wage offers for nonparticipants as if they 
were participants. The final column, the "shadow value of time" is 
constructed using the wage offer for participants [E(W le :SQ)] and the 
0 
reservation wage for nonparticipants [E(W le> Q)]. 11 r 
Figure 2 about here 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the log wage, both actual and 
predicted, for the working subsample. The distribution of actual wage offers 
is relatively flat and wide. The actual distribution is not necessarily the 
true distribution of wage offers because there are so many possible problems 
with the variable, as discussed earlier. The OLS and MLE predictions have 
almost identical distributions, tightly grouped around the mean except for a 
skewed upper tail. Judging only from this illustration, it appears that for 
workers, correcting for selection bias has little impact on the distribution 
of wage predictions. 
It is interesting to note that the mean of the log hourly agricultural 
wage (derived from a complex series of calculations based on data provided by 
the husband) is strikingly similar to the mean of the regression-based 
estimates (based on information from the wife about her own hours and 
earnings). As expected, however, the agricultural wage has a much tighter 
distribution that fails especially to capture variations at the upper end of 
the distribution. 
11 
An alternative would be to construct a wage offer for nonparticipants 
given that they do not participate: E(W le> Q).
0 
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Figure 3 about here 
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of the log of the OLS, MLE 
(selection-corrected), and community wage offers for the entire sample, along 
with the log of the "shadow" value of time. Although the similarity of the 
OLS, MLE, and community wage distributions is maintained for the whole sample, 
the predicted shadow value of time has a distribution that differs 
significantly from the others. 
Effects of Wage Instruments on Inferences in a Demand Estimate 
Table 5 contains a simple Tobit estimate of the demand for modern 
prenatal care by Bicolano women in 1977. The equations contain the price of 
prenatal visits at the closest public clinic or hospital, transport time from 
the woman's barangay to the same facility, the value of household assets, 
mother's age, urban/rural residence, mother's education, and mother's value of 
time. The estimated equations differ only in construction of the wage 
variable. The first contains no instrument for the value of time. The others 
contain, respectively, the community wage, OLS wage prediction, MLE wage 
offer, and MLE shadow value of time. A discussion of the demand model and 
related policy issues can be found in Akin et al. (1985); we are only 
interested in the effects of using different wage instruments. 12 
12 
Although identification of the wage instrument in the prenatal care 
equation may be arbitrary, it is clearly identified by both the nonlinear 
estimation procedure used to create it and by exclusionary restrictions in the 
prenatal demand model. 
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Table 5 about here 
Generally speaking, adding a value-of-time instrument to the regression 
containing no wage has little effect on most of the coefficients, a fortuitous 
event in view of the assumed orthogonality of the regressors. The price of a 
visit and transport time both tend to reduce the number of prenatal visits. 
Assets and living in a city tend to increase the number of visits. Age has 
little perceptible effect. 
The community (or agricultural) and MLE wage instruments have negative 
signs but are statistically insignificant. The OLS instrument is 
statistically significant and has a strongly negative effect on demand. 
Despite the similar distributions of the MLE and OLS instruments, the two 
methods must create substantially different wage estimates for specific women 
in order to have such dissimilar impacts in this regression. The final column 
contains the shadow wage, which is assumed to be the correct measure of the 
value of time. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 
the 89 percent level. 
That the wage instruments are consistently negative in their effect on 
demand suggests that time cost is a deterrent to women when they consider 
whether to seek prenatal care. The positive impacts of education and urban 
residence on prenatal care demand tend to be underestimated in the absence of 
a wage instrument, which suggests that the nonwage contribution of those 
variables is biased downward by not accounting for the value of time. 
If a value-of-time instrument were to be selected without the help of 
theory; that is, solely on the basis of large t-statistics, the desired sign, 
and large quantitative impact, the OLS instrument would be chosen in this 
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case. However, the correct way to measure value of time is using the shadow 
wage; the OLS prediction is riddled with theoretical and statistical problems 
that make choosing it an incorrect strategy. The OLS instrument overestimates 
by large magnitudes the absolute effects of both the wage and education 
variables. Although the community wage instrument represents a reasonable 
estimation strategy, the lack of variation in that variable across individuals 
reduces its ability to explain behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
There are many potential statistical problems associated with using a 
selection-corrected wage instrument, apart from the fact that the procedure is 
more complicated than possible alternatives. For the Philippine sample 
analyzed in this paper, however, correcting for selection bias has a number of 
desirable effects: 
1. It provides a method to estimate wages that captures the 
heterogeneous nature of both home and market workers. The 
community wage performs poorly, as would be expected, in 
capturing differences across individuals in productivity. 
2. Correlation across the errors in the wage offer and 
participation equations is strong; consequently, 
compensating for selection bias makes a large difference in 
the coefficients of the wage-estimating equation. The added 
efficiency of the MLE procedure improves the detection of 
selection bias over the two-stage procedure. Although the 
distribution of the resulting wage instrument does not 
differ substantially from the OLS instrument, its impact in 
the prenatal demand equation is quite different. 
3. The selection-correction procedure permits calculation of 
reservation wages for those who do not work, which is 
desirable on theoretical grounds. Using reservation wages 
in combination with wage offers to construct a shadow value 
of time for women not working in the market makes a 
considerable difference in both the distribution of the wage 
instrument and its performance in estimates of the prenatal 
care demand equation. 
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One advantage of combining the household production framework with 
Heckman's statistical procedure is that theory helps to define restrictions 
that allow identification of coefficients in both the reservation and offered 
wage equations. This procedure helps to make sense out of missing values that 
might otherwise be the cause for multiple sample selection corrections. The 
resulting wage offer and reservation wage specifications provide a simple 
framework in which considerations that have a distinct development economics 
flavor (such as productivity outside the market) logically enter the 
reservation wage equation but do not also enter the wage offer equation. 
The approach used in this paper is dependent on the assumption that 
families that work agricultural parcels or own businesses have opportunities 
for productive work outside the labor market that are not readily available to 
other households. Decisions to farm or to run a business are partially 
determined by offered wages; however, the relatively large fixed physical and 
human capital assets necessary for farming or running a business are probably 
safely taken as predetermined over the one-year period covered in the Bicol 
survey. 
Although the central purpose of this paper has been to examine different 
methods of measuring the value of time for a sample in which only a small 
percentage report wages, it is worthwhile to note the high return to education 
estimated for the women. The rate of return to additional schooling is about 
18 percent in the selection-corrected estimates of offered wages. In the 
reservation wage equation, the rate of return is about 5 percent. Increased 
schooling for women has--at least for this sample--the capability of raising 
their productivity both in the market and at home. This is evidence that 
additional investment in human capital can raise "full" incomes--the ability 
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to produce commodities either by buying inputs from the market or by producing 
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Table 1. Community Agricultural Daily Wage Averages, Bicol Region, 
Philippines, 1978. 
Method of Calculation 
Actually paid by farmer, all 
crops--cultivation only 
Mean (pesos per day) 
Standard deviation 
Number of people 
Percent of communities 
Actually paid by farmer, all 
crops--cultivation and harvesting 
Mean (pesos per day) 
Standard deviation 
Number of people 
Percent of communities 
Estimated replacement cost for 
family workers 
Mean (pesos per day) 
Standard deviation 
Number of people 
Percent of communities 
Actually received by farm 
workers 
Mean (pesos per day) 
Standard deviation 
Number of people 
Percent of communities 
Source: Bicol Multipurpose Survey, 
Men Women Children 
5.8 5.0 4.4 
1.5 1. 2 1.2 
777 496 129 
91 81 44 
7.7 7.9 7.7 
2.1 3.1 4.4 
847 602 237 
92 87 65 
6.3 5.2 4.9 
1.3 2.3 1. 7 
1439 566 410 
94 89 74 
8.2 5.7 6.6 
3.4 2.9 5.9 
396 42 66 
78 25 31 
1978. 
Note: Children are those less than 15 years old at the time of the survey;
they are not included in the other columns. "Number of people" is 
the number contributing data to the calculation. "Percent of 
communities" refers to the proportion of all communities for which a 
community wage could be calculated. Not all communities had workers 
in all categories. 





Experience squared Experience squared 
Education Education 
City residence 








Land area owned 
Whether family owns a 
business 
Table 3. Labor Market Participation and Wage Estimates for Married Women, Bicol Region,
Philippines, 1978. 
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Net nonlabor income/100 7.8 
(39.6) 
-.0004 
( . 3) 
.0008 





Land area owned (hectares) .96 
(2.3) 
-.018 
( 1. 2) 
.037 















Time to town center (min.) 51. 4 
(69.8) 
-.0002 














Covariance ( 01E:> -1. 685 -.684 .394 
(14.2) (2.0) ( 02 E) 
Chi-square (Likelihood ratio test)
F statistic 
R-square 











Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics for the coefficient directly above except inthe first column, where they are standard deviations. 
1These two columns come from a single maximum likelihood estimation for the full model. 
Table 4. Average Predicted Wage Offers and Reservation Wages for Workers and 
Nonworkers 
Type of Worker Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Wage Offer Wage Offer OLS Shadow 
Without With Wage Value of 
Selection Term Selection Term Offer Time 
Participants in 
the labor market .18 1.02 .95 1.02 
Nonparticipants .12 .84 .76 .45 
Note: These numbers are estimated pesos per hour, not logs. 
The estimates in the second column are based on equation 18, where 
everyone is treated as if they worked [E(W le~ Q)], which is the way 
wage offers are typically estimated but is 0 counterfactual for women who 
are not working. We cannot say on the basis of this table that 
nonparticipants should be working because their mean expected wage 
offer (.84) is greater than their mean predicted reservation wage 
(.45). Such a comparison would require estimating E(W le> Q) for 
them. 0 
Table 5. Tobit Estimates for Number of Modern Prenatal Visits by Married, Pregnant Women--Using 
Different Instruments for Value of Time. Bicol Region, Philippines, 1977. 
Independent Variables No wage Community OLS MLE wage MLE Shadow 
wage wage offer Value 
Intercept -3.6 -2.8 -5.4 -4.0 -4.1 
(2.4) (1.5) (3.1) (2.5) (2.7) 
Public clinic price -.36 -0.4 -.28 -.33 -.32 
(1.7) ( 1. 6) ( 1. 2) (1.5) ( 1. 4) 
Transport time to public -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 
(2.8) (2.9) (1.9) (2.5) (2.6) 
Value of household assets .00 .00 .00 .00 .oo 
(2.3) (2.3) (2. 7) (2.3) (2.8) 
Mother's age .03 0.03 .07 .04 .04 
(. 74) (.73) ( 1. 6) (. 93) (1.0) 
Live in city or town 1. 45 1. 38 1.66 1. 54 1. 55 
(2.3) (2.1) (2.6) (2.4) (2.4) 
Mother's education .38 .38 .78 .46 .48 
(4.2) (4.2) (3.5) (3.2) (4.4) 




MLE wage offer 
(2.0) 
-.78 




Sigma 5.06 5.05 5.02 5.03 5.04 
(20.9) (20.9) (20.9) (20.9) (20.9) 
Sample size 507 507 507 507 507 
Likelihood ratio test 
(Chi-square 7 = 20.3) 66.8 67.2 70.76 67.4 69.4 
Note: Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. 
Figure 1. Labor Market Participation and Earnings Responses, Bicol 
Multipurpose Survey, 1978. 
Any occupational work? Earnings and Hours Wage Variable 
Report earnings/hours Actual wage 
515 (31 percent> 500 (30 percent) 
Worked 
978 (58 percent> 
Received no pay Missing wage 
463 (27 percent) 1186 (70 percent) 
No job 
708 (42 percent) 
Estimate earnings 
678 (40 percent) 
Note: Wages are calculated by dividing annual earnings by annual hours. 
There are 500 nonmissing observations on wages rather than 515 because 
15 women who reported earnings did not report hours. 
Figure 2 
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